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A Liberal Actor in a Realist World? The Commission and the 
External Dimension of the Single Market for Energy  
It is often said that we live in the age of the regulatory state. Indeed, the European Union (EU)  
is regularly held up as the prime example of the “regulatory state” model because of the nature 
of its institutions, its policy tools (law and regulation rather than of redistribution and direct 
intervention in industry), and its resources (Majone, 1994, Lodge, 2008, Jordana and Levi-
Faur, 2005, Majone, 1996). This is no accident: the European Economic Community was part 
and parcel of a broader western liberal approach to International Political Economy (Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1970, Milward, 1994, Ruggie, 1982). The liberal blueprint that was built into 
the Treaty of Rome turned out to be very close to the new West European policy consensus 
at the end of the 1980s (McGowan and Wallace, 1996). Domestic policy change toward the 
economic right in France, Britain and Germany coupled with the collapse of communism 
presented the European Community with a window of opportunity: to build a liberal Single 
European Market at home and to project its liberal market model on to the international scene.  
However, by 2000 this window had begun to close. The Washington consensus became 
increasingly contested; Putin’s Russia became more assertive (fuelled by rising oil prices); and 
China emerged as an alternative politico-economic model. The central question this article 
addresses is: has the EU changed with the world in the 2000s, or does it remain a liberal actor 
– committed to the ‘regulatory state’ agenda both at home and abroad – in the increasingly 
realist world? 
The question as to what kind of international actor the EU is has been much debated, in the 
pages of this journal (Manners, 2006, Smith, 2004, Sjursen, 2006a, Sjursen, 2006b, Hyde-Price, 
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2006) and elsewhere (Peters, 2014, Soetendorp, 1999, Hill, 1996, Hill and Smith, 2011, 
Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The present article does not so much concern the nature of the 
EU as a global actor, as the external dimension of regulatory state. More specifically, the focus 
here is on the single market for energy, and the Commission’s efforts to ensure security of 
supply for two goods on which is it heavily import-dependent: oil and gas. Our investigation 
centres on the Commission’s exercise of regulatory policy tools (and not on e.g. the member 
states’ policy decisions about the desired energy mix), and on the Commission’s action as a 
more or less unified regulatory actor. To be sure, the Commission is as divided as any executive 
or regulator, and often even more so. While the Commission’s internal dynamics warrant 
investigation in their own right, this article concerns how its regulatory state identity at home 
plays out beyond the borders of the single market.  
Energy is a critical case study of the external dimensions of the EU regulatory state. It is a vital 
public policy issue in a sector that has undergone rapid geopolitical change (Noreng, 2006). 
Both the oil and gas sectors offer a strong test of the EU’s will and capacity to extend its liberal 
regime beyond its borders. Markets for molecules are more difficult to build and manage than 
markets for shoes, and market failure can have broad implications for industrial production, 
human welfare and even military security (Yergin, 1991, Helm, 2002). If the EU cannot 
respond to changes in a sector at the heart of economic policy and regulation, it can hardly be 
expected to address other strategic sectors successfully.  
Our point of departure is the observation that recent developments present serious challenges 
for the EU. Increasingly assertive producer-states, rising resource nationalism and the 
ascendance of new consumers undermine the market-based liberal model of international 
energy trade from which the EU benefitted in the early 1990s. China has adopted its own 
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approach to energy, characterised by mercantilism, national champions and off-market deals 
(Downs, 2005). Under Putin’s leadership Russia has sought to retain state control over 
strategic sectors such as energy (Gaddy and Ickes, 2009). The combination of opaquely 
governed national oil companies (NOCs) and state-flanked energy deals has contributed to 
uncertainty regarding supply and demand (Stevens, 2008, Goldthau, 2010, Downs, 2005). 
What's more, the rapid rise in oil prices after the record low of $9/barrel in 1998 to a high of 
$147 in 2008  (BP, 2011) marked a sharply increased price volatility, and created high 
adjustment costs for industry, consumers and society. Finally, a series of 'gas disputes' between 
Russia and transit country Ukraine highlighted Europe's exposure to supply risks stemming 
from conflict among third parties. As the EU’s executive and regulator, the Commission's 
declared goal therefore is to ensure "secure [...] and affordable energy" for its "people, industry 
and economy" (European Commission, 2010), 2).  
The EU could meet these challenges by measures that fit well into the liberal paradigm in 
International Relations theory (centred on open trade), or by way of more security-oriented or 
protectionist measures. For the purpose of this article, we take ‘liberal’ to entail an actor 
interpreting issues primarily in terms of trade rather than geopolitics, and employing policy 
tools designed to build and maintain open markets. To test this, we elaborate seven hypotheses 
linked to building international markets and to making them work in practice.  
The External Dimension of the EU Regulatory State  
The European single market project came to fruition at an extraordinarily favourable moment, 
with the West ideologically, politically and economically victorious in the cold war. In the 
energy sector, consumer countries were in the driver seat after the oil price collapse of 1986 
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and OPEC’s decline. By the turn of the millennium these conditions had begun to change, 
and the EU’s open market policy came under considerable stress. Both scholars and policy 
analysts have therefore called for a stronger, more muscular, and more realist external policy 
on the part of the EU (Youngs, 2009, Correlje and van der Linde, 2006, Smith, 2010). To 
assess the Commission’s response to the changing energy landscape, seven hypotheses are 
drawn up based on the presumption that the EU’s regulatory nature (and liberal norms) shapes 
the Commission’s strategy for dealing with the external dimension of the single market in 
energy. This is not to equate the regulatory state with neo-liberalism, since the regulatory state 
may often amount to a ‘rescue of the welfare state’ (Levi-Faur, 2011); it is simply to assert that 
the external manifestation of the EU’s regulatory state overlaps with liberal or open market 
approaches to international political economy. Even if EU energy policy does not live up to 
the regulatory state ideal-type, this approach allows us to elaborate expectations about the 
Commission’s external behaviour qua regulatory state.  
To be sure, the EU regulatory state never quite lived up to the ideal-type. There is a well-
documented gap between the ideal-type and energy policy as actually applied in the EU and 
across its member states (Andersen and Sitter, 2009, Pelkmans, 2001). A case in point: the 
1998 directive liberalising EU gas markets featured limited and gradual market opening, 
including for example derogations over take-or-pay contracts upon decisions by states 
(European Parliament and the Council, 1998). The second and third ‘packages’ in 2003 
(requiring that states adopt a regulated access tariff, establish independent regulators, and 
ensure non-discriminatory third party access through legal unbundling of transport from 
trading services (European Parliament and the Council, 2003) and 2009 (focusing on 
ownership unbundling, new regimes for independent systems/transmissions operators, 
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stronger national regulators, and a new EU regulatory agency (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2009)) closed the gap somewhat, but maintained energy market heterogeneity. The 
member states’ parallel authority in this sector was written into the Lisbon Treaty: “[these] 
measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its 
energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply.”  (European Communities, 2007), Art. 194(2)). 
Indeed, even the most prominent advocates of the regulatory state thesis (Majone, 1996, 
Majone, 2005) argued that although it was the central characteristic of the EU, it was not the 
only one. EU regulation governs the national regulators, and there are considerable gaps 
between EU policy and the policies actually implemented by national authorities (Andersen 
and Sitter, 2006, Hayward and Wurzel, 2012). As Lodge concluded in a cross-country analysis 
of Europeanisation of the regulatory state: “the impact of ‘Europeanisation’ remains heavily 
influenced by domestic politics and policy-making” (Lodge, 2002), 63). The key theme that 
runs through this literature and shapes the hypotheses below is the focus is on regulation – 
remedying market failure by regulatory policy tools – at the expense of other tasks such as 
redistribution or direct provision of public services and other policy tools such as taxing and 
spending or public ownership (Moran, 2002, Lodge, 2008, Levi-Faur, 2004). The first set of 
hypotheses about the external dimension of the EU regulatory state are derived from the 
assumption that its efforts to build open markets at home is also reflected in an effort to 
project the single market rules beyond its borders. In other words, the Commission sees its 
mandate not merely as building an open market (‘deepening’), but also as extending its 
geographical reach (‘widening’). In the oil and gas sector this could be done by extending the 
scope of existing trade regimes that do not cover the energy sector; by building new regimes 
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for trade in energy (including such sector-specific issues such as ‘up-stream’ investment in 
production and ‘mid-stream’ transit regimes); and by establishing rules that guarantee non-
discrimination for ‘down-stream’ (distribution and sales) market actors.  The principal causal 
mechanism at work here is the norms of the EU regulatory state (the Treaty and the 
Commission’s mandate establish open trade as an objective), but it is reinforced by the range 
of policy tools that are available to the Commission – powerful regulatory tools, but limited 
financial resources and no power to directly instruct their NOCs, let alone deploy military 
force. 
Although the regulatory state itself is deeply engrained in the EU's institutional "DNA", it was 
only in the early 1990s that the regulatory state approach could be projected beyond the then 
twelve member states. The favourable geopolitical context was the collapse of communism 
and the ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990). The EU seized the opportunity to establish 
the European Economic Area, embark on Eastern enlargement, and put in place regimes for 
trade with the ‘near abroad’. This was essentially a market-making project: an effort to extend 
the single market beyond the EU’s boundaries. However, the new geopolitical scene proved 
ephemeral, and the ‘liberal moment’ had passed by the turn of the millennium. Economic and 
political power began to shift away from the OECD world, and the ‘west’ could no longer 
(unilaterally) set the rules of the game (Ikenberry, 2008). This leaves three hypotheses to test:  
I. First, the more the EU expands its external economic policy into the energy sector, 
the more we expect the Commission to seek to extend rule-based trade regime to 
energy in order to secure a level playing field. Our empirical investigation focuses on 
EU efforts to foster international and regional trading regimes, both in terms of 
membership and in terms of extending their scope to energy.  
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II. Second, the stronger the EU's foray into addressing energy supply risks, the greater 
the Commission's use of general regulatory rules rather than ad hoc bilateral 
arrangements. Our empirical investigation focuses on the Commission’s efforts to 
extend trade regimes to cover third country investment and transit, i.e. issue areas 
which are crucial to the bloc's long term supply of oil and gas. 
III. Third, the more the lopsided market power in international energy relations becomes 
the focus of the Commission's actions, the stronger its push to maintain a level playing 
field for energy firms regardless of their national origin, rather than supporting 
European 'national champions'. Our empirical investigation focuses on the extent to 
which single market rules affect non-EU firms that operate in Europe, notably with a 
view to external monopoly gas suppliers such as Gazprom.  
Another four hypotheses follow from the assumption that as a liberal regulatory state, the 
Commission can be expected to address problems related to making markets work in terms 
of correcting EU-level market failures. In markets such as oil and gas, the challenge consist of 
ensuring price transparency and public data on supply and demand; establishing mechanisms 
to deal with supply (gas) or price (oil) shocks; establishing enforceable laws against cartels, 
firms’ abuse of their dominant position and restraints on trade (price fixing or discrimination, 
restrictions on re-sale); and  supporting crucial infrastructure, notably pipelines. Our second 
set of hypotheses are informed by these four issues – dealing with asymmetric information in 
energy markets (market data); managing externalities from non-energy events (notably political 
shocks to supply); addressing market dominance (restoring competition); and promoting the 
supply of EU-level public goods (infrastructure). The four hypotheses are: 
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IV. Fourth, the more pronounced bilateral arrangements or off-market deals in 
international energy affairs, the stronger the EU's efforts to address obstacles related 
to full and openly accessible market information on oil and gas fundamentals or shift 
information asymmetry in its own favour. Our empirical investigation explores the 
Commission’s efforts to foster transparency at home and abroad.  
V. Fifth, the more exposed EU energy markets are to external economic shocks 
(stemming from armed conflict or nationalisation or strikes in producer countries), the 
more the Commission seeks to manage rather than prevent them. Our empirical 
investigation explores the ways the EU chose to manage the consequences of political 
and economic shocks that threaten energy security.  
VI. Sixth, the more the EU shifts its attention to producer cartels and monopolies, the 
stronger the Commission's efforts to foster competition on international energy 
markets (i.e. break up cartels, rather than counterbalance them by establishing 
consumer monopsonies). Our empirical investigation explores the Commission's 
actions related to international and regional oil and gas markets.  
VII. Seventh, to the extent that transnational energy infrastructure issues are tackled, the 
Commission addresses them in terms of market imperfections arising from public 
goods characteristics related to energy infrastructure and transit, rather than resorting 
to 'pipeline diplomacy'. Our empirical investigation explores the EU’s involvement in 
providing infrastructure, through a range of policy tools that support the establishment 
and maintenance of pipelines, inter-connectors and energy networks. 
The next sections presents the findings of the empirical investigation. Because our 
investigation centres on the preferences and actions of the Commission, the empirical data 
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that provides the basis for the following analysis is drawn from Commission proposals and 
EU legislation (directives, regulations) as well as direct action through agreements with third 
parties, external projects, and the use of competition law. The data set comprise 85 energy-
related acts by the Commission between 1990 and 2012, as reported in Agence Europe, of which 
about half have a clear external dimension.i The latter were checked against reporting in the 
specialist press, particularly the Financial Times and European Voice.  
Building and Operating International Oil and Gas Markets   
Our first set of hypotheses relate to the assumption that the Commission seeks to build or 
extend rule-based markets for energy, even as global power structures shift against the liberal 
model. The relevant timeline of our investigation therefore covers both the extension of the 
Single European Market to energy in the 1990s and the effort to extend this beyond the EU’s 
own boundaries, and the more politicised period that followed in the 2000s. 
Table 1 sets out the most important policy challenges, and presents our findings on the 
Commission’s response (because we focus on the Commission’s strategies, the assessment in 
the last column captures the use of policy tools, not their effectiveness). A ‘liberal response’ is 
defined as one that is in line with the principles of the regulatory state model – and our 
hypotheses – and thus constitutes an extension of the EU’s internal regulatory state model to 
its external energy environment. ‘Non-liberal’ responses include a wider range of policy tools, 
for example measures designed to protect EU markets or firms, to project EU consumer 
power vis-à-vis third parties, or use of political and economic power to access new markets. 
Although the line is sometimes blurred, it is clear that the policy tools as actually applied by 
the Commission are by no means restricted to the ‘liberal’ toolbox.  
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[Table 1 here] 
  
Extending international trade regimes to the energy sector  
The principal policy tools by which the Commission pursues a liberal market agenda in 
external energy affairs are multilateral and bilateral agreements. The most successful example 
is the 1994 European Economic Area, which extended the Single European Market to the 
EFTA states, notably oil and gas-rich Norway, making this important supplier country a de-
facto member state of the internal market. Norway consequently has to dismantle the Gas 
Negotiation Committee (GFU), its monopoly organisation for coordinating exports of gas 
between 1986 and 2002 (Austvik, 2001). Since oil and gas has been left out of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Commission has sought to include energy in the WTO framework 
and to close energy-related loopholes such as dual-pricing for gas (Behn and Pogoretskyy, 
2012). However, when the WTO was extended to Russia (2012) and Saudi Arabia (2005), 
energy was not included (Milthorp and Christy, 2011), 293). The Energy Community Treaty, 
which includes Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, the 
Ukraine and Moldova, is a modest success that commits the signatories to rule based energy 
governance. The Commission has also started negotiations with Russia and Belarus on a legal 
framework to operate the electricity networks of the Baltic Member States "[i]n line with the 
agreed roadmap for full implementation of internal market rules" (European Commission, 
2012a). In addition it uses a number of softer policy instruments, including financial support 
of non-supply related programs in renewable energy and energy efficiency, the establishment 
of expert groups to discuss technical issues, and a wide range of partnership agreements 
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(Association Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, SYNERGY 
agreements). 
The overall finding is that the Commission pushes a liberal agenda that represents an external 
extension of its own regulatory state. To the extent that the EU ventured into regulating the 
energy sector as part of its external economic policy, it took a strictly rule-based approach. To 
be fair, this finding is unsurprising. The EU's overall preference for free trade is hard-wired 
into the organisation through its treaties and fundamental principles as well as member state 
economic policy preferences (Moravcsik, 1998). The expansion of EU external economic 
policy to energy since the early 1990s has therefore been very much shaped by the EU’s overall 
liberal paradigm. Although there are exceptions to the EU’s general free-trade disposition, 
energy is no longer among them.  
Building regimes for transit and investment   
The EU has taken several steps to address risks related to security of supply, particularly linked 
to upstream investment and transit. The main policy tools are international agreements 
pertaining specifically to the oil and gas sector.  The Commission has sought to establish stable 
and predictable legal frameworks and trans-national dispute-resolution mechanisms. This is 
based on the conviction that both gas and petroleum trade require substantial upstream 
investment in production capacity and midstream spending on transport infrastructure, which 
in turn requires a long time-horizon of involved public or private companies.  
A case in point is the Energy Charter Treaty of 1991 (Dore and Bauw, 1995, Waelde, 1995). 
Although Russia signed the ECT, it declined to ratify the treaty and stopped the provisional 
application of the ECT in 2009. The ostensible reason was the treaty’s bias toward the EU’s 
14 
 
interests and western liberal principles, and its signing at a time of Russian weakness 
(Selivanova, 2012). As for Norway (which has also not ratified the ECT), transit and trade with 
the EU are covered by the EEA agreement and the Norwegian regulatory regime. In addition, 
the 2006 Energy Community Treaty commits the signatories to implementing the EU gas 
liberalisation legislative packages. This provides the Commission with a policy tool to influence 
transit rules outside its own immediate jurisdiction, not least because of the expertise it shares 
with non-member states and their regulatory authorities. Indeed, this affects the entire energy 
sector in these states, not merely transit and investment.  
A final example of the EU's rule-based approach to energy investment and transit are the 
numerous Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) it has signed since 1999, which 
typically include chapters related to energy. The latter usually make reference to WTO rules 
and formalize consultation on technical or regulatory issues. PCAs are often complemented 
by a series of legally non-binding but still institutionalized 'agreements' or 'dialogues', such as 
the cooperation agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue. After the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and the Ukraine, the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue was complemented by an early warning mechanisms aimed at moderating 
and de-escalating conflict surrounding energy transit, and a new EU Russia Gas Advisory 
Council to exchange view on future gas trends. The effectiveness of these measures is clearly 
debatable, given the successive 'gas crises' that neither forum helped to prevent or solve. Still 
the Commission clearly comes across as a liberal actor, and has consistently made use of 
general regulatory rules in addressing energy supply risks, although these rules leave some 
room for manoeuvre when it comes to implementation (see below). 
Including external suppliers in single market rules 
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With regards to challenges arising from external companies, our principal finding is that the 
Commission extends its standard policy instruments for liberalising the gas sector to non-EU 
firms.  Notwithstanding the member states’ room for manoeuvre, the basic principle is that all 
firms active within the EU have to comply with EU competition rules and energy market 
regulation. The best example is the end of Norway’s GFU. More controversially, this implies 
that non-EU firms that operate in the EU market are bound by its rules, as the Microsoft cases 
illustrated (e.g. Case T-201/04). In effect, the Commission's tactic in terms of both liberalising 
EU gas markets and ensuring that the rules cover external suppliers have been guided as much 
by pragmatic problem-solving as by liberal principles. The most obvious example is the so-
called ‘Gazprom clause’ in the 2009 Third Energy Package (Council of Ministers, 2009), Art. 
11). This was tailored specifically to address the failure of the ECT and concerns about 
Gazprom’s dominant position (Eikeland, 2011). It not only requires that non-EU firms 
comply with unbundling rules as far as their EU operations are concerned – what Cottier, 
Matteottti-Berkutova and Nartova call a kind of ‘conditionality for firms’ – it also stipulates 
that member state authorities that certify transmission operators should ensure that non-EU 
firms’ ownership does not put security of supply at risk, a requirement that does not apply in 
the case of EU firms (Cottier et al., 2010). The ‘Gazprom clause’ thus opens for considerable 
deviation from the liberal market model. 
What's more, the Commission has sought to extend EU competition rules and energy market 
regulations to third countries and make them applicable to their companies, operators and 
regulators. The obvious case again is the Energy Community Treaty, which extends single 
European market rules to the EU's near abroad.. To be sure, some EU member states have 
openly challenged the Commission's approach and have pushed for the establishment of 
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'national champions' as a way to counterbalance the lopsided market power of non-EU energy 
firms. A case in point here is the GdF-Suez merger of 2008, promoted by the French 
government. Still, the EU Commission has abstained from supporting these efforts, and 
instead stuck to competition policy tools and related regulations across the board. That said, 
we find some room for heterogeneity in the policy tools as applied by the Commission either 
directly or in its oversight of national regulators. This becomes clear in some of the 
Commission’s efforts to deal with the next four challenges, related to making energy markets 
work.  
Addressing lack of transparency as a market failure  
The Commission has made increasing transparency in international energy markets a key 
policy objective. Whilst the oil market may be the only truly integrated commodities market 
on the planet, around half the international crude oil trade still takes place bilaterally through 
medium and long term contract. Even the part that is subject to spot and futures trading lacks 
some key characteristics of fully functioning markets. Important producers, such as Saudi 
Arabia, reveal neither capacity nor reserves; key consumers, such as China, conceal their level 
of demand. Even the available market data suffers from a lack of accuracy and common 
standards of measurement (Holscher et al., 2008, IEA, 2009). A key objective of the 
Commission therefore is to smoothen price volatility by providing openly accessible 
information. The International Energy Agency is tasked with providing such data for oil 
markets (but only for the OECD countries): the Commission supports its efforts at three 
levels: direct support for IEA and the Joint Oil Data Initiative through Eurostat; collection of 
data on agreements between EU firms and their third-country suppliers; and market statistics 
pertaining to the EU. 
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In natural gas, the Commission was the driving force behind a Council Decision of 2012 
institutionalizing the exchange of information on member states’ bilateral energy agreements 
with third countries (European Parliament and the Council, 2012). Compared to oil, European 
gas markets are, if anything, even further from the text-book model of an open market. 
Because gas is primarily transported by pipeline, most trade remains regional. For historical 
reasons the gas trade outside North America is dominated by long-term take-or-pay contracts 
(the buyer pays even if they do not take the gas) and is therefore bi-lateral, with prices often 
pegged to oil. The challenge as identified by the Commission lies in disclosing pricing 
arrangements between external suppliers and individual European countries. This can be 
interpreted as an effort to curb price discrimination (which has long characterized European 
gas markets) as well as an attempt to shift information asymmetries into its own favor.  
Either way, the Commission’s measures are all scored as fully liberal, in terms both of policy 
tools and their application. Bilateral arrangements and challenges related to non-disclosure by 
market actors have been consistently addressed by efforts to gather and disseminate openly 
accessible information.   
Managing external shocks   
The EU has taken several steps to address potential price or supply risks stemming from non-
energy events. In oil, events such as war (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war), domestic political turmoil in 
producer countries (e.g. in Nigeria's Niger delta) or industrial disputes (e.g. the 2002 PdVSA 
strike in Venezuela) can trigger sever price shocks. Here, the EU’s policy efforts have centred 
on buffering oil price shocks by maintaining and managing strategic petroleum stocks, which 
can be released to counter the effect an external shock. It does this by supporting the IEA’s 
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coordination of release of stocks in emergencies. With regards to gas, disputes between a 
producer and a transit country can have severe repercussions for third party consumers. As 
case in point is the two-week 2009 crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which interrupted gas 
supplies to five South-East European countries (and led to reported losses of some $1.5bn for 
Gazprom). Reacting to that, the EU now requires member states to hold stocks and put in 
place measures for dealing with disruptions, and it has promoted measures to make supply 
networks more robust (e.g. Trans-European Energy Networks, interconnectors and reverse 
pipeline capacity). In all, the Commission’s measures are clearly directed at managing 
externalities and coping with their effects, rather than preventing them from occurring, and is 
thus fully in line with the regulatory state logic and the notion of liberal policy tools. 
 
 
Coping with imperfect competition  
The Commission has taken on the challenge to tackle powerful producer cartels and 
monopolies among the EU's external suppliers. In natural gas, these efforts come against the 
backdrop of market power shifting (back) to Russia and other Eurasian producers in the 2000s, 
after a decade of a post-communist ‘gas bubble’ (Stern, 1995). The Commission attempts to 
deal with this through to competition law, e.g. the above-cited break-up of the GFU and 
decisions that oblige firms that supply the EU market to remove ‘destination clauses’ that 
restrict a buyer’s freedom to re-sell gas anywhere in the EU. It also has launched anti-trust 
cases against monopoly supplier Gazprom, based on “concerns that Gazprom may be abusing 
its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets in Central and Eastern European 
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Member States” (European Commission, 2012b), and vetted member states’ (or their firms’) 
bilateral deals with main suppliers. In oil markets, imperfect competition is a problem at the 
global (not the regional) level, and mainly related to OPEC controlling some 43 percent of 
global oil production, around 60 percent of globally traded oil and 72 percent of proven 
reserves (BP, 2013). The Commission’s efforts with respect to oil are therefore channelled 
through the IEA. Overall, therefore, the finding is that the Commission's efforts center on 
making markets function more efficiently (and managing market risks) rather than 
counterbalancing lopsided market power of key supplier.  
However, there are some important exceptions to the Commission’s liberal strategy. Two 
cases merit attention. First, the Commission has proposed what effectively amounts to a gas 
buyers’ consortium in the shape of the Caspian Development Corporation. While the project 
has effectively been halted, the implicit aim was to pool EU consumer power vis-à-vis Central 
Asian producer states in order to secure large volumes of gas for Europe and diversify sources 
of supply beyond Russia (IHS CERA, 2010). Second, the Commission has engaged in 
negotiating Poland's long-term gas contracts with Russia in 2010. The Commission acting as 
a ‘referee’ and vetting deals negotiated between its member states and third parties can be 
regarded as ‘liberal’, aimed at ensuring compliance with single market rules. It can, however, 
also be a means to throw consumer weight behind deals with strong third-country suppliers 
(European Parliament, 2012). Both examples take the Commission considerably beyond its 
regulatory state role. Although the Commission’s active role in supporting member states’ in 
negotiations with Gazprom/Russia and the Caspian initiative constitute non-liberal responses 
to a lopsided regional gas market, they can be seen as second-best efforts to address market 
failures.   
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Providing and supporting physical infrastructure  
With regard to energy infrastructure, the Commission has supported the establishment of 
pipelines, interconnectors and other transport infrastructure that exhibit public goods 
characteristics.  This is primarily an issue in natural gas, where pipeline multiplicity is a public 
good inasmuch as it reduces the EU gas market’s reliance on a single external supplier - Russia 
– or a dominant transit route – across the Ukraine. The Commission takes a two-pronged 
approach to this challenge.  
On one hand, it extends its competition-driven model beyond its own borders by liberal 
measures, in its effort of build markets. The Commission has for instance asked six EU 
member states to renegotiate their deals on the planned South Stream pipeline bringing gas 
through the Black Sea to South Eastern Europe.  Standard liberal measures to make markets 
work include the INOGATE technical assistance programme to promote construction of 
inter-connector infrastructure for the Eurasian gas network, or the multilateral TRACECA 
agreement, which aims at supporting pipeline infrastructures from and to the Caspian Sea.  
One the other hand, the Commission also supports infrastructure projects in order to 
overcome the public goods aspect of the pipeline problem. This sometimes requires 
compromising on competition policy. Here, the Commission’s tools include both financial 
support and regulation. Examples include the exemption of the Nord Stream pipeline between 
Germany and Russia under the Baltic Sea from some single market rules, and for the Nabucco 
pipeline initiative that was designed to establish a ‘Southern Corridor’ to Central Asian gas 
circumventing both Russia and the Ukraine. The EU also made a financial commitment to 
Nabucco that included a grant for a feasibility study and 200 million Euro from the European 
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Economic Recovery Programme. Moreover, the Commission - notably in the persons of 
energy commissioner Oettinger and president Barroso - has engaged in direct talks with 
potential supplier countries in the Caspian region (European Commission, 2011). Whilst this 
does not amount to Russian-style energy 'diplomacy' (Stulberg, 2008), it certainly leaves the 
'liberal' paradigm. Still, and although Nabucco eventually lost out to the rivalling Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) pipeline project, these decisions and actions can be seen as efforts to help supply 
public goods (pipelines). At the same time, they may be interpreted as efforts to support 
infrastructure projects designed to circumvent dominant external players such as 
Gazprom/Russia or the Ukraine. Whilst not liberal in outlook, these efforts to 'making 
markets work' by diversifying supply thus increasing gas-on-gas competition to compensate 
for the failure to extend single market rules on trade, transit and investment to the former 
Soviet states.  
 
Conclusion: The Mostly Liberal External Face of the EU Regulatory 
State 
Overall, our main finding is that the Commission – and EU as a whole – has indeed adopted 
a liberal paradigm, but with plenty of room for ambivalent interpretation. This points toward 
two broad conclusions. First, in external energy policy, the Commission is – mostly – a liberal 
actor, even as the world of energy turns more realist. Second, it is so by choice. Although the 
institutions and policy tools of the regulatory state constrain the Commission’s external action, 
its toolbox contains more than simply regulatory tools. When it comes to how to build markets 
for energy and extend their geographical reach, the Commission’s strategy (and indeed the 
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strategy of the EU as a whole) is overwhelmingly liberal. Its overall aim is the establishment 
of rule-based open market energy trade, rather than ad hoc-bilateral arrangements. When it 
comes to making markets work, the findings are more diverse. When addressing asymmetric 
information and managing the consequences of external shocks to price or supply, the liberal 
toolbox suffices. However, when it comes to pipeline politics and coping with Gazprom’s 
dominant supply role, regulatory policy tools are supplemented by diplomacy, finance and ad 
hoc exemptions to open market rules. We argue that this represents a pragmatic solution to 
the dilemma the EU faces in an increasingly ‘realist’ international context: if it is not possible 
to extend the regulatory state, it might be necessary to compromise on some of its principles 
abroad in order to maintain the regulatory-market model at home. The conclusion that the 
EU is a liberal actor in a realist world therefore merits the adjective mostly. This adjective is of 
considerable significance. The fundamental challenge for the Commission is that the EU is 
increasingly caught between its liberal market model and a world less and less inclined to stick 
to this model. The EU’s response has been to stick to its liberal guns – by choice and with 
conviction – even if this no longer fully resonates in the new environment, but to explore 
pragmatic use of a wider range of policy tools. Its use of non-liberal tools represent a second-
best strategy; an effort to work around problems when its primary strategy fails. 
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i The reporting in Agence Europe was checked against a full data set of more than 800 energy related 
acts, including a large number of technical decisions, reported by the Commission in the same time 
frame. 
                                                 
